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SUBORDINATION AGREEMENTS©
By BRUCE MACDOUGALL*
Subordination agreements are not novel concepts in
Canadian law, but the PPSAs ensure their more
widespread use. Subordination agreements usefully
provide flexibility to creditors and consequently permit
enhanced access to credit for debtors. The adaptability
of the subordination agreement presents difficult legal
problems, the most important of which relates to
characterization of their legal nature. Other problems
include the resolution of multiple subordinations and
the question of the enforceability of subordination
agreements in bankruptcy. This paper explores those
issues and cautions against undue restrictions being
placed on either the availability or the characterization
of subordination agreements.
Les contrats de subordination ne sont pas un nouveau
concept dans Ie droit canadien, mais les Lois sur les
sflret6s mobili4res aident A rendre plus r6pandu rusage
de ces contrats. Ils donnent aux criditeurs une
flexibilit6 utile qui, par cons6quent, permet aux
d6biteurs l'acc s am6 ior6 au crdit. L'adaptabilit6 du
contrat de subordination pose des probl~mes l6gaux
difficiles, le plus important 6tant la caract6risation de
leur nature 16gale. Parmi d'autres problames sont la
r~solution des subordinations multiples et la question
de l'ex6ecution des contrats de subordination dans les
situations de banqueroute. Cette dissertation examine
ces questions-lk et agit en avis contre le placement des
restrictions excessives sur l'acc~s A, ou la caract6risation
de, ces contrats.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A subordination agreement is an arrangement whereby one
creditor expressly and voluntarily agrees to subordinate its claim against
the debtor to the claim of another creditor. That other creditor can,
thus, have its obligations against the debtor satisfied first. The
subordination could relate to the debts owed to the creditors involved or
it could be a re-arrangement of priority to specific property of the debtor
in which the creditors have an interest to secure the payment of the
debts owed to them. The subordinated debt might have been superior to
the other (now senior) debt before subordination (which is usually the
case where the subordinated debt is secured) or it might have ranked
equally with the other debt before subordination.
There are three parties commonly directly affected by a
subordination agreement: the debtor, the subordinated creditor (i.e., the
creditor who takes a back seat), and the senior creditor (i.e., the creditor
who gains the advantage of the agreement). 1 Of course, there can be
other interested individuals: other debtors, a trustee in bankruptcy, and
other creditors. There can be different types of subordinated debt such
that there is a hierarchy among the subordinated creditors ("layered
debt"). The debtor might have, for instance, four classes of
subordinated debt, for example: "senior subordinated debt,"
"subordinated debt," "junior subordinated debt," and "capital debt."2
The possible existence of different classes of subordinated debt will
mean that a potential senior creditor will want to ensure it knows the
ranking of the would-be subordinated creditor with whom it proposes to
deal.
1 There is rough agreement among writers on the use of these terms. See, for example, P.F.
Coogan, H. Kripke & F. Weiss, "The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination Agreements,
Security Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge Clauses, and Participation Agreements"
(1965) 79 Harv. L. Rev. 229 at 233.
2 E. Everett, "Subordinated Debt-Nature, Objectives and Enforcement" (1964) 44 B.U. L.
Rev. 487 at 495.
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Subordinated debt has been referred to as "debt that serves
equity."3 A subordinated debt is akin to equity in that it is used as a tool
to increase the ability of the debtor to borrow from senior lenders.
Financially, it can be described as equity4 or as a sort of "quasi-equity."
However, it must not be forgotten that legally it is debt. Both the
subordinated debt and the senior debt have to be paid back. They both
have fixed maturity dates, mandatory periodic interest payments, and
fixed principal amounts.
The subordination agreement is far from a novel legal concept,
especially in the United States, where the subordination agreement was
recognized early on,5 and was introduced into the Uniform Commercial
Code (ucc) as section 1-209, which is a general provision allowing one
obligation to be subordinated to another.6 In Canada, the use of
3 See R.W. Johnson, "Subordinated Debentures: Debt that Serves as Equity" (1955) 10 J.
Finance 1; and P.R. Wood, The Law of Subordinated Debt (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1990) at 3-4.
4 See B. Johnston, "Debt Subordination: The Australian Perspective" (1987) 15 Australian
Bus. L Rev. 80 at 81 [hereinafter "Debt Subordination"].
5 See, for example Re Associated Gas & Electric Co., 53 F. Supp. 107 (Dist. Ct., S.D. N.Y.,
1943); Bird & Sons Sales Corporation v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1935) [hereinafter Bird & Sons];
Re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & TolL, 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938); and Re George C Bnms Co., 256 F. 840
(7th Cir. 1919).
6 This section has been adopted by fewer than twenty states, but those states include important
ones such as California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York. Closely
related to subordination agreements is the American doctrine of equitable subordination which
permits a bankruptcy court to subordinate the claim of one creditor to the claims of others. For
further reading, see J.W. Dickens, "Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of Lender
liability: Toward a New Model of 'Control'" (1987) 65 Tex. L. Rev. 801; B. Weintraub & AN.
Resnick, "From the Bankruptcy Courts: The Application of Improvement of Position and Equitable
Subordination Doctrines-Clark Pipe Reconsidered" (1990) 23 U.C.C. LJ. 198; and A. DeNatale
& P.B. Abram, "The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement
Creditors" (1985) 40 Bus. Law. 417.
Equitable subordination, which is related to the power of a trustee in bankruptcy to avoid
preferences and fraudulent conveyances, is seen as a method of assuring justice. The doctrine
developed out of two U.S. Supreme Court cases: Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 59 S. Ct. 543
(1939); and Pepper v. Litton, 60 S. Ct. 238 (1939). The U.S. Congress expressly recognized the
doctrine in the Bankniptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.S. §§ 521-1330 (Law. Co-op. 1986-87) at §
510. The most common grounds for subordinating claims by using the doctrine of equitable
subordination are:
(1) the existence of fraud or illegality in the particular transaction; (2) severe
undercapitalization of the corporation attributable to the claimant; and (3) the existence
of such complete control of the corporation that it is essentially an instrumentality or
'alter ego' of the claimant
L.E. Nyzio, "Mobile Steel and Beyond: Trends in Equitable Subordination" (1986) 37 S. C.L.
Rev. 627 at 629.
The doctrine has no statutory basis in Canada, but there is some basis for arguing that it is part
of Canadian law. In Laronge Realy Ltd. v. Golconda Investments Ltd. (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 74
(B.C.C.A.), there is dicta approving the doctrine. Compare AEVO Co. v. D & A MacLeod Co.
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subordination agreements has become common with the introduction of
the Personal Property Security Acts (PPSAs). 7 These statutes make
explicit references to subordination agreements, but only in the context
of security interests.8 There is no equivalent to section 1-209 of the ucc
which is a general reference to, and permission to, employ subordination
agreements.
This paper examines the subordination agreement. It looks at its
constitution, use, and the problems associated with it. In particular, the
paper examines the theoretical questions of the legal nature of the
subordination agreement and the practical problems that arise in the
context of bankruptcy. There is no single answer to all the problems
associated with subordination agreements-in large measure, because
the term embraces so many different situations. It will be shown that
there are good arguments for treating the subordination agreement as a
contract or as a security agreement,9 and somewhat weaker arguments
for treating it as a trust or as an assignment. Classification as one does
not necessarily preclude classification as another. Not all subordination
agreements must fit into the same category. Subordination can be a
useful tool and both the legislatures and the courts should strive to
enhance its usefulness, even in the context of bankruptcy.
(1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 33 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)). The Supreme Court of Canada left the question of
the availability of equitable subordination under Canadian law "open for another day" after its brief
discussion in Canada Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Canadian Commercial Bank (No. 3) (1993), 131
Alta. Rep. 321 at 384. See also L. Crozier, "Equitable Subordination of Claims in Canadian
Bankruptcy Law" (1992) 7 C.B.R. (3d) 40; and R.W. Ewasiuk, "Defeating Shareholders' Loans:
Laronge Realty Ltd. v. Golconda Investments Ltit" (1987) 25 Alta. L. Rev. 504.
7 The PPSAs in force on 1 January 1994 are as follows: Alberta: SA. 1988, c. P-4.05; British
Columbia: S.B.C. 1989, c. 36; Manitoba: R.S.M. 1987, c. P35; Ontario: R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10;
Saskatchewan: S.S. 1979-80, c. P-6.1; and Yukon: R.S.Y. 1986, c. 130.
Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Saskatchewan have plans to proclaim into effect PPSAs similar
to Alberta and British Columbia's in the near future. The Northwest Territories' PPSA will be
proclaimed in the more distant future. Prince Edward Island has passed a PPSA (S.P.E.I. 1990, c.
42), but has no plans to proclaim it. References in this paper will be to sections in effect on 1
January 1994, unless otherwise stated.
On the PPSAs, see R.C.C. Cuming & R.i. Wood, British Columbia Personal Property Security
Act Handbook (Toronto: Carswell, 1993); R.C.C. Cuming & R.J. Wood, Alberta Personal Property
Security Act Handbook (Toronto: Carswell, 1993); and R.C.C. Cuming & RJ. Wood,A Handbook
on the Saskatchewan Personal Property Security Act (Saskatoon: Law Reform Commission of
Saskatchewan, 1987). On the law relating to subordination in many countries, see The Law of
Subordinated Debt, supra note 3.
8 lbid. Alberta, s. 40; British Columbia, s. 40; Manitoba, s. 39; Ontario, s. 38; Saskatchewan, s.
39; and Yukon, s. 38. These sections trace their origins to ucc § 9-316.
9 In this paper the terms "security interest" and "security agreement" are treated as though
they have the meanings given them by the definitions sections of the PPSA s, supra note 7: Alberta, s.
1(1); British Columbia, s. 1(1); Manitoba, s. 1; Ontario, s. 1(1); Saskatchewan, s. 2; and Yukon, s.
1(1).
Subordination Agreements
II. TYPES OF SUBORDINATION AGREEMENTS
Subordination agreements can be of different types. They can be
"as various as the wit and imagination of the drafts[person] permit."1 0
Some of the distinctions that can be made will be discussed here; and, as
will be seen, there is a good deal of overlap.
A first division can be made between contingent subordination l
and absolute subordination.1 2 A contingent subordination agreement
provides that a creditor will have its rights or entitlements subordinated
only in the event of specified circumstances, usually insolvency or
bankruptcy. The parties could, however, agree to any contingency, often
involving the debtor achieving (or failing to achieve) a particular
financial state. A senior creditor might wish some type of default other
than bankruptcy to constitute the triggering mechanism of the
contingent subordination because bankruptcy is one of the least effective
ways for a creditor to collect from the debtor. Before the specified
contingency occurs, the creditors usually assume their normal priority
positions for the purposes of repayment by the debtor and priority to
collateral. Thus, any payments made by the debtor before the
occurrence of the contingency would be unaffected by the contingent
subordination agreement. Contingent subordination agreements are
similar to preferred stock schemes or to the old system of taking a
floating charge on a debtor's assets.
The contingent subordination agreement is preferable to the
subordinated creditor because it allows for the continued repayment
and, possibly, the complete repayment of the subordinated creditor
before the subordination takes effect. It is, for the same reason, also less
beneficial for the senior creditor. The senior creditor might seek to
change this somewhat by putting in some sort of controls, such as
10 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, vol. 2 (Toronto: Little, Brown, 1965) at
986.
11 This has been called an "insolvency subordination" by Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, supra note
1 at 234. D.M. Calligar calls this type of subordination agreement an "inchoate" subordination in
"Subordination Agreements" (1961) 70 Yale LJ. 376 at 377; and in "Purposes and Uses of
Subordination Agreements" (1967) 23 Bus. Law. 33 at 34.
12 Calligar calls this a "complete" subordination agreement in "Subordination Agreements,"
ibid. at 378.
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payment schedules, to slow payment by the debtor to the subordinated
creditor.13
An absolute or complete subordination agreement is not
contingent on any event other than the validity and enforceability of the
agreement itself. This type of subordination agreement can take a
variety of forms. It can be specific in relating to one particular debt, one
particular payment, or priority to specific collateral; or, it can be general,
in that the senior creditor gets priority over the subordinated creditor for
any obligation owed by the debtor, or the senior creditor gets priority to
all collateral in which the subordinated creditor has an interest. In an
absolute subordination agreement relating to debt, the subordinated
creditor does not usually get paid by the debtor until the senior creditor
is fully paid. Great care has to be exercised by the parties in drafting any
subordination agreement: what was intended as a general subordination
agreement could easily turn into a specific subordination agreement if
the parties overlook the inclusion of such items as interest, future debts,
or interests in proceeds. Subordination agreements could be a
combination of general and specific in the sense that there could be, for
instance, a general subordination of debt repayment in relation to
priority to specific collateral.
Another division in subordination agreements is between a
security subordination 4 and a payment or debt subordination. The first
type of subordination agreement alters the arrangement for priority to
collateral between creditors that would exist in the absence of the
subordination agreement. The security subordination involves the
secured debt of, at least, the subordinated creditor. With this type of
subordination, the subordinated creditor loses the priority to collateral it
otherwise would have against the senior creditor. The second type of
subordination alters the order in which payment will be made to the
creditors and might or might not involve secured debt. Often this
second type of subordination is contingent on an event such as
bankruptcy or insolvency, but both the security and the debt
subordinations could be either absolute or contingent.
A further categorization of subordination agreements is between
ab initio (or "public" or "institutional") subordination agreements, in
which the subordinated creditor has never had an unsubordinated claim
13 It has been suggested that a contingent debt subordination wherein the subordinated
creditor has only a conditional right to repayment of its loan, is a good way of protecting the senior
creditor. The advantages and disadvantages of this solution are discussed in "Debt Subordination,"
supra note 4 at 116-20.
14 This is also called a "lien subordination" in the United States.
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against the debtor, and a subsequent (or "private") subordination where
the subordinated creditor agrees to subordinate its claim to the senior
creditor after the subordinated creditor's debt is in existence. 15 An ab
initio subordination is instigated by the debtor from the outset. The
debtor wishes to have (at least) two kinds of debt, one subordinated to
the other. The ab initio subordination agreement is between a debtor
and a subordinated creditor or creditors, the senior creditor being a
third-party beneficiary. Ab initio subordinations are generally part of a
corporate issue of debentures. The subordinated debt, commonly
known as subordinated debentures, has some characteristics of preferred
stock. This typically involves a large dollar amount and the terms of the
debt are usually governed by a trust indenture between the debtor and a
trustee who represents the debenture holders. The best-known recent
type of ab initio subordination agreement is the junk bond, often used in
the context of leveraged buy-outs, in which investors, usually
subordinated creditors, are compensated for their low repayment
priority by a high interest return. The ab initio subordinated debenture
will commonly have the subordination clearly indicated on its face to
avoid misleading third parties.
Whereas a private subordination agreement limits the number of
senior creditors who can benefit from the agreement, an ab initio
subordination agreement allows an indeterminate number of senior
creditors to benefit. Usually, a private subordination agreement is
absolute, while an ab initio subordination agreement is contingent,
allowing for some repayment to the subordinated creditors until the
contingency occurs. While the subordinated creditor in an ab initio
subordination agreement is often a large outside investor or an investing
institution, the subordinated creditors in a private subordination
agreement are commonly owners, officers, directors, or shareholders of
the debtor. Given the status of these subordinated creditors, private
subordinations have "psychological fringe benefits" for the senior
creditor "in that they prevent the insider from draining off the cash
assets of a financially troubled company."16 Though the distinction
15 See M.D. Heileson & M.W. Hirsch, "Private Subordination Agreements and the U.C.C.: Is
Section 1-209 an Un-Wyse Solution?" (1983) 38 Bus. Law. 555; D. Kravitz, "The Outer Fringes of
Chapter 11: Nonconsenting Senior Lenders' Rights Under Subordination Agreements in
Bankruptcy" (1992) 91 Mich. L. Rev. 281 at 285-86; J.L. Lopes, "Contractual Subordinations and
Bankruptcy" (1980) 97 Banking LJ. 204 at 206; and D.G. Baird & T.H. Jackson, Cases, Problems,
and Materials on Security Interests in Personal Property, 2d ed. (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press,
1987) at 865.
16 R. Golin, "Debt Subordination as a Working Tool" (1961) 7 N.Y.L.F. 370 at 377, as cited by
Lopes, ibid at 208.
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between ab initio and private subordination will usually relate to the
subordination of debt, and though most security subordinations will be
set out in private subordination agreements, there is no reason why a
security subordination could not be involved in an ab initio
subordination agreement.
III. WHO IS INVOLVED
Subordination agreements can involve a number of parties.
They can be between two creditors or they can be between creditor and
debtor. Conceivably, they could be tripartite or multi-party agreements.
A subordination agreement between two creditors need not involve the
debtor at all, who need not, therefore, know of its existence. However, it
is difficult to imagine why creditors would go to the trouble of arranging
the subordination agreement themselves, independently of the debtor.
It is more likely that if a subordination agreement were to exist between
two creditors, the debtor would act as an intermediary, approaching the
subordinated creditor either at the request of the senior creditor or in
anticipation of the needs of a would-be senior creditor. This is not often
complicated or difficult since the subordinated creditor is commonly the
major shareholder or owner of the debtor. Other typical subordinated
creditors are parties who have given the debtor a guarantee. Again,
these are usually individuals with close connections to the debtor or to
the owners of the debtor. If the subordinated creditor is not affiliated
with the debtor, it will typically be an institutional lender who has
provided a term loan at a higher interest rate or a secured lender who
has a general security agreement that is more than adequate to protect
its interest.17
As mentioned, the subordination agreement could be between
the debtor and a creditor-the subordinated creditor, as is usually the
case, with contingent and ab initio subordination agreements. The fact
that the subordination agreement is in place allows the debtor to go out
and raise more capital from other creditors.18 One creditor might, for
the sake of the business interests of the debtor, always wish that its
position be subordinate to other secured parties. The effect of the
17 For a brief discussion of players in a transaction see A.J.F. Kent, "Layered Financing:
Subordination and Other Legal Puzzles" (1991) 8:4 Nat. Insolv. Rev. 36.
18 The objectives of subordination are discussed in J.R. Powell, "Rethinking Subordinated
Debt" [1993] Lloyd's Marit. & Comm. L.Q. 357 at 358-59; and in The Law of Subordinated Debt,
supra note 3 at 2-3.
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subordination is often non-enforcement of the subordinated creditor's
loan. The debtor might be in financial difficulties and a creditor might
hope that subordinating its debt will help the debtor to weather the
difficulties.
The senior creditor might be a specific individual or a class of
individuals with no pre-determined composition. With contingent and
ab initio subordination agreements it may be difficult to say at any given
time who is a creditor of the debtor. Those with the clout to insist on the
subordination agreement will usually be major lenders if the would-be
subordinated lenders are small, or small creditors if the would-be
subordinated lenders are large. Another common situation involving
subordination agreements is when two secured creditors have general
security agreements with the debtor. They will then use subordination
agreements to sort out between themselves who will have priority to
what. Such a practice is encouraged by some PPSAs which require that
collateral in a security agreement be described by item or kind, or that
security be all of the debtor's present and after-acquired personal
property (possibly excepting specified items or kinds of personal
property)j 9 Such a requirement may preclude, for example, the taking
of a security interest in "all widgets distributed by X" as this may not be
a description by item or kind. Accordingly, the secured party will enter
into a security agreement which includes broader collateral than is
actually needed. The secured party will then enter into subordination
agreements (which, assuming that the subordination agreements are not
themselves security agreements, are not subject to the pigeon-holing
demanded by the PPSA in security agreements) with other lenders that
effectively limit the security to that which was actually desired.20
Any would-be senior creditor will want to clearly determine its
position. It will want to ensure that it will be the senior creditor, and to
do this will determine the ranking of its would-be subordinated creditor.
It will want to ensure when and whether it will be paid and how payment
will affect the value of the subordination agreement. A subordinated
creditor will wish to have similar information for different reasons. It
will be particularly concerned about the number and extent of other
creditors because, once the subordination agreement is in effect, a
19 Supra note 7: Alberta, s. 10(1)(b); and British Columbia, s. 10(1)(b). See, similarly:
Saskatchewan, s. 10(1)(b); and Yukon, s. 8(1)(b). Manitoba, s. 10(b) and Ontario, s. 11(2)(a)
require only that there be "a description of the collateral sufficient to enable it to be identified."
20 Note that this practice can lead to some very complicated problems in deciding the ranking
to proceeds.
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subordinated creditor will be in a particularly precarious position should
the debtor face financial difficulties.
The debtor can be of many different types. It could be an
individual, a small business, or a small lending institution which seeks to
have different categories of debt in order to allow it to raise funds.
Subordinated debt allows the owner to avoid the dilution of its equity,
yet still raise money. Any subordinated debt may cost the debtor less
than would issuing more shares or borrowing outright without the use of
subordination.
IV. THE FORM OF A SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT
Given the variety of types of subordination agreements and the
many possible combinations of creditors, debtors, debt, and timing, the
drafting of a subordination agreement can be no easy task. Simply using
a precedent could easily lead to grief. Clarity of meaning is essential,
especially when large sums of money are involved. The importance of
making clear the intention to create a subordination agreement was
highlighted by the case of Royal Bank of Canada v. P.D.S. Sales
Limited.21 In that case, P.D.S. Sales entered into a purchase and sale
agreement whereby P.D.S. agreed to sell its assets to the debtor. The
debtor granted to P.D.S. a chattel mortgage which provided that P.D.S.
would execute any documentation necessary to postpone the chattel
mortgage in favour of a chattel mortgage granted to the debtor's bank.
Once P.D.S. registered its chattel mortgage pursuant to the PPSA, the
bank was given a general security agreement from the debtor which it
then registered under the PPSA. No subordination agreement between
P.D.S. and the bank was executed. In an action upon the receivership of
the debtor, the Court held that the clauses in the purchase and sale
agreement and in the chattel mortgage, which purported to subordinate
the interest of P.D.S. to that of the bank, were "merely an agreement to
agree." According to MacFarland J., "If the clauses in the documents
were clearly meant to constitute an agreement to subordinate, words to
the effect that the subsequent encumbrance will rank in priority to the
prior encumbrance should have been included as they were in the
Euroclean case."22 The importance of clear drafting of a subordination
agreement was also highlighted in Chrysler Credit Canada Ltd. v. Royal
21 (1989), 80 C.B.R. (N.S.) 248 (Ont. S.C. (Div. Ct.)).
22 bid. at 252.
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Bank of Canada,23 when the two levels of courts came to different
conclusions on whether a subordination agreement applied to the facts
at hand 4
A subordination agreement relating to debt will often provide:
(1) that the subordinated creditor not receive payment from the
debtor until the senior creditor is paid;
(2) that if such an "improper payment" is received, the subordinated
creditor will hold it "in trust" for the senior creditor;
(3) that in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy, the subordinated
creditor's dividend will be paid to the senior creditor-thus
giving a "double dividend" to the senior creditor--i.e., the senior
creditor's dividend plus the subordinated creditor's dividend;
(4) that after the senior creditor's claims are satisfied, the right to
receive dividends reverts to the subordinated creditor. 25
From the point of view of the senior creditor, the subordinated
debt is much like equity. According to one writer, this means that
subordinated debt, from the perspective of the senior creditor, should do
four things:
(1) It should be incurred at the outset of the transaction and not on
a revolving basis.
23 (1985), 5 P.P.S.A.C. 64 (Sask. Q.B.), rev'd (1986), 6 P.P.S.A.C. 153 (Sask. C.A.).
2 4 See, similarly, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. International Harvester Credit Corp.
of Canada (1985), 4 P.P.S.A.C. 329 (Ont. H.C.), rev'd on other grounds (1986), 6 P.P.SAC. 273
(Ont. C.A.). Note that a court is free to use principles of custom and usage to help determine
ambiguous parts of an agreement. See Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 711 at 774; and The Chase Manhattan Bank v. The First Marion Bank, 437 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir.
1971).
2 5 This is based on the American Bar Association Model Simplified Indenture ((1983) 38 Bus.
Law. 741 at 769-71) discussed in D.G. Carlson, "A Theory of Contractual Debt Subordination and
Lien Priority" (1985) 38 Vand. L. Rev. 975 at 982-83. For a check-list of terms to put in a
subordination agreement, see Kent, supra note 17 at 41-42. On problems in drafting subordination
agreements, see E. Everett, "Analysis of Particular Subordination Provisions" (1967) 23 Bus. Law.
41; R.T. Nassberg, "What to Watch for in Drafting Subordination Agreements (with Forms)"
(1986) 32 Practical Law. 73; L.E. Denonn, Secured Transactions under the Original and the Revised
UCC, 6th ed., Commercial Law and Practice Handbook Series, No. 9, (New York: Practising Law
Institute, 1974) at 23-26; and R.A. Hillman, J.B. McDonnell & S.H. Nickles, Common Law and
Equity under the Uniform Commercial Code (Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1985) at s. 24.03.
A useful discussion of considerations to take into account in subordination agreements is found in
P.R. Wood, Law and Practice ofIntemational Finance (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980) at 408-411
[hereinafter International Finance]; and The Law of Subordinated Debt, supra note 3, c. 7. A
discussion of problems of drafting in the American context and of a Model Subordination
Agreement are found in Heileson & Hirsch, supra note 15 at 566-71. On the problems of
interpreting a subordination agreement, see W.W. Bratton, Jr., "The Interpretation of Contracts
Governing Corporate Debt Relationships" (1984) 5 Cardozo L. Rev. 371.
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(2) It should mature no earlier than the final repayment date of the
senior debt.
(3) It should carry no protections, rights of acceleration, or other
rights commonly associated with debt which could disrupt the
borrower's operations at a time when the senior creditor would
prefer otherwise.
(4) It should be fully subordinated in right of payment to the agreed
"senior" debt of the borrower at all times, especially when the
borrower is insolvent 2 6
Note that there would be problems for the senior creditor if the
subordinated creditor were allowed to set off its debt against some
other. The senior creditor would want warranties against this.27
Consideration for the subordination agreement would also need to be
addressed, especially if there were subsequent creditors who hoped to
benefit from an earlier subordination agreement.28
A subordination agreement relating to security priority should be
somewhat easier to draft. The agreement would specify when the
subordination takes effect, in relation to what collateral, and for what
sums of money. It should also clarify whether it is to affect priority to
proceeds from the disposition of collateral-the subject of the
subordination.
A senior creditor will probably want some sort of protection
against the debtor and against the subordinated creditor's altering the
subordination agreement so as to affect the interests of the senior
creditor. This may be difficult if the senior creditor is not a party to the
subordination agreement. Side agreements are a possible resolution, as
are the concepts of waiver, estoppel, or vested rights. In some PPSA
jurisdictions, a secured party can rely on the subordination agreement
section of the PPSA to enforce its rights, even though it is a third party
to the subordination agreement 29 It will have to be assured that a party
to a subordination agreement has the corporate capacity to subordinate
and that, in the case of a partnership, matters are not complicated by
one partner subordinating for the whole partnership.
26 C.M. Niclaides, "Priorities for Subordinated Debt" (1989) 4 Butterworths J. Int'l. Banking
& Fin. L. 247 at 247.
27 See the consideration of the set-off issue in The Law of Subordinated Debt, supra note 3, c.
6.
28 The problems of privity are addressed below in the section entitled "Contract."
29 See section entitled "Security Interest," below.
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The existence of a subordination agreement could act as an
incentive to put the debtor in bankruptcy if the senior creditor's rights
are contingent upon bankruptcy. The senior creditor has a certain
incentive to trigger the event that gives it priority. To counteract this,
mechanisms should be built into the subordination agreement to prevent
this from being a real incentive.
V. SECURED VERSUS UNSECURED DEBT
The subordination agreement can relate to either secured or
unsecured debt. In Canada, it is likely that secured debt will be involved
because of the protection the subordination sections of most PPSAs give
to parties in situations in which the secured party is the subordinated
creditor. Concerns of privity are of reduced importance in some of
those PPSA jurisdictions. Secured claims can also arise in the context of
section 427 of the Bank Act.30 The Bank Act makes no mention of
subordination agreements, but there is no reason to suppose that there
could not be a subordination involving an interest created and registered
under the BankAct.
The claims of the creditors involved can also be a mixture of
secured and unsecured. The existence of the subordination agreement
may be the reason the senior debt is unsecured, the senior creditor
assuming the position of the secured (subordinated) creditor. When the
subordinated debt is secured, there is every incentive for the senior
creditor to ensure that the subordinated creditor has registered its
interest. Once the subordination is in effect, the senior creditor might
try to register its own security interest against the debtor, arguing some
sort of assignment from the subordinated to the senior creditor; or, the
senior creditor might register against the subordinated creditor, again
arguing that there has been an assignment by the subordinated creditor
or that it otherwise has a security interest in the property of the
subordinated creditor. In this way the senior creditor is not totally
dependent on the viability and position of the subordinated creditor.
Before the introduction of the PPSAs, the subordination of
secured debt was effected by the use of the floating charge.31 A floating
3 0 S.C. 1991, c. 46.
31 On floating charges, see RJ. Wood, "The Floating Charge in Canada" (1989) 27 Alta. L.
Rev. 191; P.D. Maddaugh, "Security on Personal Property in the 1980s" in Corporate Law in the
1980s; Special Lectures of the Law Socety of Upper Canada 1982 (Don Mills: Richard De Boo, 1982)
349 at 357-62; R.C.C. Cuming, "Commercial Law-Floating Charges and Fixed Charges of After
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charge presented conceptual problems that are similar to those of
subordination agreements. Under the PPSAs, a security interest in the
nature of a floating charge on personal property is no different from
other security interests in that it must be perfected in order to give its
holder any real security. 2 The perfection will mean that it will have
priority over most other subsequently perfected security interests. 33
Merely using the form of the floating charge will not ensure that any
form of subordination will follow. In the absence of an explicit
subordination agreement or clause, it is unlikely that a Canadian court
would interpret the nature of the security interest, Le., the floating
charge, to mean that the holder intended to be subordinated to
subsequent creditors. 34 Canadian creditors need to become familiar
with subordination agreements instead of relying on older devices such
as the floating charge. Even when a court finds that the equities favour a
subsequent over an earlier creditor, the subsequent creditor will not gain
priority over the former unless it has a subordination agreement.35
Peter Maddaugh thinks that the subordination agreement
section "appears to be a satisfactory answer" to the possible loss of the
flexibility of the floating charge due to the adoption of the PPSA. He
writes:
Section 39 [the subordination agreement section] of the PPSA permits a secured party,
either in the security agreement itself or otherwise, to subordinate his interest to any
other security interest. Obviously express subordination would solve the problem in any
given situation and may, in large dollar or otherwise significant transactions, be resorted
to out of caution. But express subordination falls well short of the flexibility afforded in
the normal floating charge context. There is nothing in the Act, however, that would
appear to prohibit a generalized subordination given in advance. Indeed, the broad
scope afforded to the parties under section 9 of the Act to enter into a security agreement
Acquired Property: The Queen in the Right of British Columbia v. Federal Business Development
Bank" (1988) 67 Can. Bar Rev. 506; and E. Ferran, "Floating Charges-The Nature of the Security"
(1988) 47 Cambridge L.J. 213.
32 Note that floating charges may continue to be useful in the context of real property. See
R.J. Wood, "The Floating Charge on Land in the Western Provinces" (1992) 20 Can. Bus. LJ. 132;
and Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on Floating Charges on Land (Report No.
103) (Vancouver. The Commission, 1989).
33 The connection between the floating charge and a subordination agreement was discussed
in a limited way by Houlden J.A. inEuroclean Canada Ina v. Forest Glade Investments Ltd. (1985),
49 O.R. (2d) 769 (CA), leave to appeal refused (1985), 55 C.B.R. (N.S.) xxvii (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
Euroclean Canada]. The parties in that case adapted a clause common in floating charge
debentures to be used as a subordination clause in the context of the PPSA.
34 See J.S. Ziegel, "Recent and Prospective Developments in the Personal Property Security
Law Area" (1985) 10 Can. Bus. L.J. 131 at 152-53. The proposed Manitoba PPSA s. 40(2) explicitly
states that there is no equation between the use of a floating charge and an intention to subordinate.
35 The subsequent creditor may also have a purchase money security interest that gives it
priority. See Haibeck v.No. 40 Taurus Ventures Ltd. (1991), 59 B.C. LR. (2d) 229 (S.C.).
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that is "... effective according to its terms between the parties to it and against third
parties ... " would seem to support the proposition. It may, therefore, be argued that the
mere use of the term "floating charge" by the parties in describing the security interest
being created implicitly carries with it a generalized subordination-that is, the consent
of the secured party to the debtor to deal with the charged collateral in the ordinary
course of his business free of, or subordinate to, the lien represented by that charge.
However, until our courts have actually confirmed this to be the case, the more cautious
among us may wish to insert appropriate generalized subordination language into the
security agreement.
3 6
The final words of warning are probably worth following.
Despite the common use of subordination agreements among
unsecured creditors in the United States, it does not appear to be quite
as common in Canada0 7 There is very little case-law or writing on point.
There is no generalized Canadian statutory provision equivalent to the
ucc section 1-209 that specifically allows for the existence and
enforceability of subordination agreements 38 It would appear that the
avoidance of subordination agreements in this context is a result of
concerns about enforceability, both in bankruptcy and by third parties
because of the doctrine of privity. These concerns are similar to those in
Australia, England, and New Zealand. As will be evident in later
sections of this paper, there are good arguments to be made that neither
of these issues should be of concern, at least not in all cases. The
American experience has shown how valuable subordination agreements
can be in financial arrangements among secured creditors. Whatever
the current situation, it can be said with confidence that, as
subordination agreements become more common within the PPSA
context, they will also become more common outside the PPSA context.
VI. SUBORDINATION QUESTIONS
The brief, almost matter-of-fact treatment of subordination
agreements by the PPSA and the non-existence of other generalized
statutory references to them leaves a number of questions unanswered.
The remainder of this paper attempts to answer some of those questions.
36 Supra note 31 at 361-62. This passage was cited, without express approval, by Houlden JA.
in Euroclean Canada, supra note 33 at 285. Note that now the subordination agreement section
itself (in most jurisdictions) deals with the effectiveness of the subordination agreement according
to its terms.
3 7 Gilmore states that, in the United States, subordination agreements are principally used to
regulate priorities between unsecured claims: Supra note 10 at 984.
38 However, most of the United States do not have a § 1-209 in their versions of the ucc.
Section 1-209 is set out in the section "Security Interest," below.
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A. Legal Nature of Subordination Agreements
The first issue is the exact legal nature of a subordination
agreement. There is remarkably little discussion in Canada as to
whether the ucc-type subordination agreement "fits" in Canada. This is
surprising given the somewhat active debate in the United States about
the legal nature of subordination agreements.3 9 The question is one of
considerable importance in terms of the form of the subordination
agreement, its effect, and the proper parties to it. It is also an important
question for the purposes of deciding what effect insolvency or
bankruptcy will have. Is it a simple contract? It cannot be a contract
like others because the doctrine of privity does not apply in some
situations.40 Is it a type of security agreement? If not always, is it
sometimes? Is it a trust? Can it be more than one thing? Is it simply a
type of estoppel? The question of the legal nature of the subordination
agreement is not limited to the context of personal property obligations.
It arose under the pre-PPSA systems and can arise in the context of land
mortgages. One mortgagee can agree to subordinate its mortgage to a
later mortgagee. It is assumed that this agreement effectively alters the
priorities, yet English law never provided a clear answer as to why.41
The next section examines the five concepts most useful in
determining the legal nature of a subordination agreement in Canada. 42
These concepts are: assignment, trust, waiver, contract, and security
39 See "Subordination Agreements," supra note 11 at 384ff; E. Everett, "Subordinated
Debt-Nature and Enforcement" (1965) 20 Bus. Law. 953; R.M. Zinman, "Under the Spreading
U.C.C.- Subordinations and Article 9" (1965) 7 B.C. Indus. & Comm. L Rev. 1 at 25; and A.C.
Leiby, "Enforcement and the UCC" (1967) 23 Bus. Law. 57 at 60ff.
40 See the section on "Contract," below.
41 R.M. Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security, 2d ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1988) at 23ff
42 There are three concepts that have some support outside Canada but that would be of
limited relevance here:
(1) In Re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son, Inc, 16 F.2d 289 (S.D. N.Y. 1926), Learned Hand J. began
the American idea that a subordination constitutes a type of equitable lien. In Anglo-Canadian law,
an equitable lien is a type of remedial measure. It does not arise out of agreement and, thus, could
not be created by a subordination agreement.
(2) Goode characterizes the subordination of an unsecured claim to that of any other creditor
as a form of negative covenant. The substance of the negative covenant is not to collect the debt
due to the subordinated creditor before the senior creditor has been paid: supra note 41 at 24.
(3) Another possibility is that a subordination agreement is simply a manifestation of a type of
estoppel. While the subordination agreement does have some estoppel-like qualities, in Canada
estoppel is problematic in that it is difficult to use as the basis for a cause of action. See B.
MacDougall, "Consideration and Estoppel: Problem and Panacea" (1992) 15 Dalhousie L.J. 265.
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interest. Each of these concepts provides at least a partial explanation of
the legal nature of a subordination agreement. As well, each provides its
own set of problems. It appears that there is no single, simple solution
to the question of the legal nature of the subordination agreement.
Given the many different types and contexts of subordination
agreements, it is perhaps advantageous not to try to expect them all to
have the same legal nature.
1. Assignment
A subordination bears many resemblances to an assignment.4
One party agrees that its ranking will be replaced by another. There is
the view, as will be discussed, that a subordination agreement can
amount to an assignment not only of rank but of interest as well. The
Official Comment to ucc section 1-209 assumes, however, that a
subordination agreement and an assignment are different entities. It
states that nothing in the section prevents one creditor from assigning its
rights to another creditor of the same debtor in such a way as to create a
security interest within Article 9.
As mentioned earlier, a distinction can be drawn-as regards
secured obligations, at least-between the subordination of a debt and
the subordination of security. The latter subordinates priority to
collateral only, while the former reverses the order of payment that
would otherwise occur. In the United States, there is authority to the
effect that the subordination of debt is not an assignment, and,
therefore, the ownership of the debt is not transferred on subordination;
whereas, the subordination of security priority is an assignment of the
security interest held by the subordinated creditor and, therefore, one
secured party (the subordinated creditor) is replaced by a new one (the
senior creditor) in terms of their priority to collateral while the
underlying debts remain unaffected. 4 4 In Citibank, N.A. v.
Tele/Resources, Inc.,45 the Court appeared to equate a subordination
agreement relating to a lien, i.e., to security, with an assignment of a lien.
4 3 An "equitable assignment" theory was used in Re Handy-Andy Community Stores, Inc., 2 F.
Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1932).
4 4 See First National Bank of Holywood v.American Foam Rubber Corp., 530 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.
1976) [hereinafter First National Bank]; and Cherno v. Dutch American Mercantile Corp., 353 F.2d
147 (2d Cir. 1965) [hereinafter Cherno]. See also Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, supra note 1;
"Subordination Agreements," supra note 11; and compare Carlson, supra note 25.
45 724 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds 21 Bankr. 358 (S.D. N.Y. 1982).
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The subordination agreement, if simply an assignment of security
position, could serve to elevate the status of an unperfected security
interest to that of a perfected security interest. This view allows senior
creditors-assignees-who have not perfected their interest to rely on
the perfecting act of the subordinated creditor-assignor. The argument
would be that the "assignment" of security position simply replaces one
secured creditor with another and would not itself be a security interest
requiring registration, as would an assignment of debt. 46 In Cherno,47
the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that in the absence of
provisions expressly stating otherwise, a subordination agreement
relating to debt does not constitute an assignment even of security.
According to the Court:
The usual subordination agreement simply gives priority or precedence of lien right and
debt payment to a junior indebtedness over a senior but subordinated obligation. It does
not in and of itself assign to the junior creditor or encumbrancer the senior debt or the
evidence of the senior debt or the security covering it. Subordination is something quite
apart from an assignment of an obligation or its accompanying security.48
However, the Court added that if there is an express assignment of the
debt in the subordination agreement, then the security is also transferred
because security cannot exist apart from the debt for which it is given.
There are arguments in favour of treating a subordination
simpliciter as an assignment. It can be argued that the subordinated
creditor's claim is no longer part of the subordinated creditor's estate,
but is the property of the senior creditor. This is important if both the
subordinated creditor and the debtor have financial difficulties-as is
commonly the case where the subordinated creditor is personally or
closely connected with the debtor. Another benefit of treating
subordination agreements as assignments would be the legal certainty
that would follow, in that all of assignment law could, with necessary
modifications, be brought to bear on the subject. If subordinations of
debt are assignments, then they would themselves create security
interests and should be perfected under the PPSA. There would then be
fewer concerns about secrecy.49
There are several points to be made against the idea of a
subordination agreement being automatically considered an assignment.
46 For support for this view, see Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, supra note 1 at 260.
47 Supra note 44.
48!bMd. at 151.
49 See the section on "Security Interest," below.
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Carlson makes some of them. First, security subordination cannot be
easily reconciled with assignment doctrine:
In a [security] subordination agreement, the only collateral for either the senior or junior
claim is the property that the debtor has offered both parties as collateral. The junior
claim, which is the property of the junior secured party, is not collateral for the senior
claim. The junior secured party does not promise to receive no payment on the junior
claim. It may receive unencumbered cash from the debtor without violating any rights of
the senior secured party. If the collateral were to disappear, the senior and junior
secured parties would be equal general creditors of the debtor. In these respects, lien
subordination differs from debt subordination. 5 0
Carlson adds that security cannot be assigned separately from the
underlying debt. Thus, if a subordination of debt is not automatically an
assignment, how can it be said that the subordination of security is an
assignment on its own? Furthermore, once the debtor has been notified
that a chose in action has been assigned, only payments to the assignee
will extinguish the debt. In subordinations without an express
assignment or an express trust, it would be highly unusual for the debtor
to pay the senior creditor money intended to satisfy the debt owed to the
subordinated creditor.
As noted, the assignment theory could allow the senior creditor
to get the benefit of perfection without a separate perfecting act on its
part. Even when the subordination is only related to security, it does not
seem unreasonable that the senior creditor should have to make its own
perfecting act and not be permitted to rely on the subordinated
creditor's. This view finds support in Wilmot v. Central Oklahoma Gravel
Corp.,51 in which the Court held that a bank, which had a perfected
security interest, could subordinate its claim against the debtor to that of
a general creditor. It could not, however, by agreement raise the status
of that general creditor, who had no particular priority position on its
own because it failed to file a proper financing statement, to a position
of priority over other general creditors. Other creditors have a right to
know that a second encumbrance exists or that there is a "new" secured
party. As will be seen in the section entitled "Security Interest,"
equating subordination agreements simpliciter with assignments and,
thus, with security interests could lead to awkward situations and, at
least in British Columbia, might appear to be contrary to the section of
the PPSA that says that a subordination does not, of itself, constitute a
security interest. Furthermore, if the subordination is of a Bank Act
security interest, then treating the subordination as an assignment might
5 0 Carlson, supra note 25 at 1020.
51620 P. 2d 1350 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
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contravene the spirit of section 428(14) of thatAct, which provides for
the assignment of security in only certain types of situations.
In the end, the better view is that a subordination agreement and
an assignment do two different things. The former is more of a
rearrangement of priority, whereas the latter is a substitution of one
party for the other. To achieve a true assignment, parties should make
an assignment and not count on the inference of one from a
subordination agreement. There is no reason why parties cannot have
both an assignment and a subordination agreement, but it avoids
countless problems to consider them distinct concepts.
2. Trust
A subordination, particularly of debt, could be seen as a type of
trust imposed on the subordinated party-or possibly the debtor.52 The
trust could be constructive, in the sense that it may not have been
expressly intended by the parties, or express, in that the parties
intentionally used the tool of trust to assist in the goal of
subordination.53 The one party-the subordinated creditor-receives
money because of the original order of priority, but, because of the
subordination agreement, the usual order is changed in terms of
entitlement to keep the money or the property. The subordinated
creditor would hold the money in trust for the senior creditor. The trust
approach to subordination agreements is especially helpful if there is a
privity problem, i.e., if the subordination agreement is between the
debtor and the subordinated party, and the senior creditor wishes to
recover money paid to the subordinated creditor that, by the terms of
the subordination agreement, should have gone to the senior creditor.
Some of the PPSA subordination agreement sections resolve this without
the need to resort to a trust solution. However, in other jurisdictions
and where the PPSA section is inapplicable (for example, where there is
no secured debt), the express trust approach to the subordination
agreement will be most useful to the senior creditor. The trust analysis
is obviously not as necessary if the original agreement is between two
creditors themselves.
52 The constructive trust theory was used in Re Dodge-Freedman Poultry Company, 148 F.
Supp. 647 (D. N.H. 1956).
53 The use of trusts in subordination is given an excellent treatment in The Law of
Subordinated Debt, supra note 3, passim.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, considered the idea
of a subordination agreement as a constructive trust in Chemo.5 4 The
case illustrates the uses and limitations of the constructive trust. The
Court held that in certain cases where it could be shown that one party
would otherwise be unjustly enriched, the Court would impose a
constructive trust extending from the subordination agreement. In the
case before it, the Court held that if, at the conclusion of the bankruptcy
proceeding of the debtor, liquidation had been accomplished and a
distributive dividend were ordered to the two creditors, then the senior
creditor, on the theory of the constructive trust, could, to the extent of its
claim, receive the subordinated creditor's dividend under the
subordination agreement and thereby prevent the subordinated creditor
from taking it and using it for its own purposes. However, the Court said
that, on the facts of the case, when the subordinated creditor had
released its security interest without consideration, it could not be
argued by the senior creditor that a constructive trust was implied in its
favour upon the chattels that formed the collateral of the released
security interest. The subordinated creditor had neither registered an
interest of its own nor its subordination agreement, and the
subordination agreement did not constitute an assignment of the
subordinating creditor's security. The senior creditor, therefore, had
nothing more than a promise by the subordinated creditor not to apply
any payment against its debt until the senior creditor was paid in full.
According to Anderson J., "breach of a contract concerning payment of
a debt furnishes no basis for the finding of a constructive trust."5s
If there is a trust extending from a subordination agreement, the
courts will look carefully to see what forms the subject matter of the
trust. A senior creditor will have to ensure that it has considered all
possibilities so as to prevent the subordinated creditor from
circumventing the spirit of the agreement. For example, in First National
Bank,56 the subordinated creditor exchanged its debentures and notes
from the debtor for the debtor's preferred stock. The Court held that
the exchange did not constitute payment of the subordinated creditor's
obligations for the purposes of the subordination agreement. There was
no breach of any trust obligation.
Van Graafeiland . writes:
54 Supra note 44.
55 Ibid at 154.
56 Supra note 44.
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The discharge of the subordinated indebtedness in the instant case occurred before its
maturity and three years prior to the debtor's bankruptcy. There is no claim of any
"scheme" or bad faith and no contention that the discharge was made in contemplation
of bankruptcy...
It requires little imagination to conceive of the discharge of a subordinated debt many
years prior to bankruptcy, or, indeed, without any subsequent bankruptcy ever taking
place. If the decision appealed from is correct, such discharge would nonetheless be a
breach of the subordination agreement, because of the remote chance that bankruptcy
might someday occur and the senior creditor might thereafter be deprived of a double
dividend. We think that if the senior creditor would prohibit a discharge because of such
remote contingencies, he should so provide in the subordination agreement. 57
Undoubtedly, a trust can play a role in the working of a subordination
agreement. It may be essential to allow enforcement by the intended
beneficiary of the subordination agreement. However, though a trust
might flow from some subordination agreements, it is clear that
subordination agreements generally are not trusts.5 8 A court might
impose some sort of constructive trust to satisfy all parties' expectations
flowing from the subordination agreement; or, the parties themselves
might expressly create the trust to ensure that their expectations are
satisfied. It should be noted that in the case of the creation of an express
trust when (as will usually be the case) the goal is to secure performance
of the subordinated creditor's obligation to the senior creditor, the
parties will have created a security interest subject to the PPSA.59
3. Waiver
Subordination is similar to waiver in that it is the consensual
surrender of one's right or position in favour of another. Where there is
an absolute subordination agreement, and especially where the
subordination agreement is between two creditors, one might equate
subordination with waiver. Even the ab initio subordination is,
conceptually, closely connected with waiver. It is more difficult to cast a
contingent subordination agreement as a waiver. If a subordination
agreement is a type of waiver, then it is only a partial waiver, the
subordinated creditor only waiving its position in favour of selected
individuals, i.e., the senior creditors. A subordination agreement should
not change one's position vis-ii-vis creditors who are neither parties to
5 7 1bidi at 456.
58 The use of trusts (and other devices) as alternatives to subordination are discussed in
Powell, supra note 18 at 370ff.
59 See the section entitled "Security Interest," below.
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the subordination agreement nor its intended beneficiaries. 0 A waiver
can be formal or informal. An advantage of using a waiver is that it can
be enforced by a third-party beneficiary even if that party was not a party
to the contract that contains the waiver, so long as the third party acted
on it.61 This does require the knowledge of the third party in order to
act on the waiver.62 The difficulty with using waiver is that it might be
withdrawn on future occasions. It does not provide the security that is
required of a subordination agreement. Nonetheless, the language of
waiver was used by Houlden J.A. to explain the subordination section of
the PPSA in Euroclean Canada.63 In that case he stated that "[the
subordination agreement section] is intended to confer a statutory right
on a secured party to waive the priority given him by the PPSA and to
confer a corresponding right on the beneficiary of such a waiver to
enforce it."64 Though he did not use the language of contract, a better
view might be that Houlden J.A. thought that a subordination
agreement has aspects of both contract and of waiver-the best of both
worlds.
4. Contract
The subordination agreement seems most naturally to be a
contract. In Vahising Christina Corp. v. First National Bank of Hobbs,65
Ramsey C.J. said: "We hold that a subordination agreement is nothing
more than a contractual modification of lien priorities and must be
construed according to the expressed intention of the parties and its
terms. '66 It cannot be concluded simply from the word "agreement"
that something is a contract. Estoppel and trust are based on
agreement, and they are not, at least primarily, contracts. The
subordination agreement, however, has all the hallmarks of a contract: it
60 See Goode, supra note 41 at 24.
61 See Exparte Moore Re Stokoe (1876), 2 Ch. D. 802; and B. Johnston, "Contractual Debt
Subordination and Legislative Reform" (1991) J. Bus. L 225 at 243 [hereinafter "Contractual Debt
Subordination"].
62 In the English context, it has been argued that waiver is the closest acceptable concept to
explain and rationalize English decisions. See Johnston, ibd at 241.
63 Supra note 33.
64 ]bid. at 285-86.
65 491 S.W. 2d 954 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1973).
6 6Ibid. at 958. See also First National Bank, supra note 44 at 454.
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is an agreement between parties which affects their actions in the future,
it can be reconciled with the requirements of offer and acceptance, an
intention to create legal relations, and consideration. The parties who
are involved in a subordination agreement would probably see it as a
type of contract affecting their debts and priority positions.
If a subordination agreement were a type of contract, then there
would be a problem of enforcement if: (1) it were an ab initio
subordination agreement between the subordinated creditor and the
debtor; and (2) it were the senior creditor who wished to take advantage
of it. Generally speaking, only those party, ie., privy, to a contract can
enforce it or take advantage of it.67 Weick C.J., in the case of Wyse v.
Pioneer-Cafeteria Feeds Ltd-,68 stated: "It is to be noted, however, that
the enforcement of subordination agreements between creditors of the
same bankrupt, affects only their rights and does not interfere with or
change the rights of other creditors."69 It is for this reason, to
circumvent the doctrine of privity, that some PPSAs specifically make
the subordination agreement effective and enforceable by third parties.
There are three types of PPSA subordination sections which get
progressively more like the ucc section 1-209, depending roughly on the
age of the section.
Manitoba represents the original version of the subordination
section. Section 39 of the Manitoba PPSA states that "[a] secured party
may, in the security agreement or otherwise, subordinate his security
interest to any other security interest."7 It was this type of clause that
was dealt with in the leading Canadian case on subordination
agreements. In Euroclean Canada,71 a floating charge debenture, given
by the debtor to a creditor, contained a subordination clause enabling
the debtor to buy goods subject to security interests that would rank
ahead of the creditor. Euroclean sold equipment to the debtor under a
conditional sales contract. Its registration of a financing statement
under the PPSA was too late to be effective. The Ontario Court of
Appeal ruled that its failure to make a timely registration did not affect
its right to enforce the subordination clause. While Euroclean could not
67 On privity, see R. Flannigan, "Privity-The End of an Era (Error)" (1987) 103 L.Q. Rev.
564; S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 3d ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 1993) at c. 9
("Third Party Beneficiaries"); and Hillman, McDonnell & Nickles, supra note 25, at s. 24.03[2].
68 340 F. 2d 719 (6th Cir. 1965) [hereinafter Ryse].
69 Ibid. at 723.
70 See also Saskatchewan, s. 39; and Yukon, s. 38, supra note 7. This is also proposed by
Prince Edward Island, s. 38, supra note 7.
71 Supra note 33, rev'g (1984), 46 O.R. (2d) 14 (H.C.).
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enforce it at common law because it was not a party to the contract, the
subordination agreement section of the PPSA conferred both a statutory
right on a secured party to waive the priority given by the PPSA and a
corresponding right on the beneficiary of such a waiver, i.e., Euroclean,
to enforce it. Euroclean, therefore, was held to be entitled to priority
over the creditor which held the floating charge.
Houlden J.A. wrote:
If s. 39 [the subordination agreement section of the Ontario PPSA] means only that a
subordination clause is enforceable by a third party who is a party to the agreement which
created it, the section is bootless, as it adds nothing to the common law. In my opinion, s.
39 is intended to confer a statutory right on a secured party to waive the priority given
him by the P.P.S.A. and to confer a corresponding right on the beneficiary of such a
waiver to enforce it, even though he is not a party to the agreement which created it or
has no knowledge of its existence. 72
Houlden J.A. expressly relied on a comment by Professor Jacob Ziegel
who argued for the eventual Court of Appeal interpretation of the
subordination clause section of the PPSA, saying that a different
interpretation would mean that a subsequent creditor would somehow
have to extract from the subordination agreement a unilateral contract
between him and the debenture holder.73
It was to avoid having to use inferences to achieve the Euroclean
result that Ontario revised its subordination section, which is now
section 38:
A secured party may, in the security agreement or otherwise, subordinate the secured
party's security interest to any other security interest and such subordination is effective
according to its terms.
The problem with this section is that it still does not explicitly mention
third parties. It is only by inference that privity is abolished in the
subordination agreement context. Despite this provision and Euroclean,
one would want to give only a tentative opinion in Ontario as to the
abolition of privity.
The Western PPSAs specifically deal with the problem. British
Columbia's section 40 states:
A secured party may, in a security agreement or otherwise, subordinate his security
interest to any other interest and the subordination is effective according to its terms
72 Ibid. at 285-86. This case was followed in Royal Bank v. Gabriel of Canada Ltd. (1992), 3
P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 305 (Ont. CJ. (Gen. Div.)). On the Eurocean case, see J.S. Ziegel, "Commentary:
The Scope of Section 66a of the OPPSA and Effects of Subordination Clauses" (1984) 9 Can. Bus.
L.. 367; and J.R. Varley, "Commentary. Floating Charges, Subordination Clauses and Section 66a
of the OPPSA" (1985) 10 Can. Bus LJ. 482.
73 Ziegel, ibid. at 373.
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between the parties and may be enforced by a third party if the third party is the person
or one of a class of persons for whose benefit the subordination agreement was
intended.74
These provisions should be completely adequate to deal with the privity
issue, at least in the context of secured debt.
However, to the extent that the PPSAs do abolish the privity
doctrine, it is only effective when the subordinated debt is that of a
secured party. Privity of contract remains an issue in situations where
the debt involved is unsecured and, even where the debt involved is
secured, in jurisdictions without the PPSA concession to third party
enforcement.
There are practical problems that arise from the doctrine of
privity that could affect a senior creditor that is not a party to a
subordination agreement. 75 Obviously, there is the problem of
enforcement. Furthermore, the parties to the subordination agreement
could vary its terms without the consent, or even the knowledge, of the
senior creditor. The senior creditor might wish to have collateral
contracts or some sort of trust mechanism to cover this eventuality. 76
The subordinated creditor might have a claim to set-off against the
debtor (or vice versa) and this might cancel any real benefit to the senior
creditor. The senior creditor will have to insist on guarantees from the
subordinated creditor, perhaps in a side agreement.
One of the problems with the privity rule, and any statutory
dealing with it, is the tenacious way in which Canadian courts have
upheld the sanctity of the doctrine of privity.77 Various devices can be
used to get around privity, including collateral contracts, 78 trust, 79
agency,80 and even estoppel. It has been noted earlier that treating a
subordination agreement as a waiver will, in some circumstances,
preclude the privity problem from arising because of the ability of a
74 See also Alberta, s. 40, supra note 7. This is what is proposed in Manitoba and
Saskatchewan, ss. 40(1), supra note 7, and in New Brunswick, S.N.B. 1993, c. P-7.1 s.40 [not yet
proclaimed in force].
75 See "Debt Subordination," supra note 4 at 118-20.
76 See the section entitled "Trust," above.
77 See, for example Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd. v. Beattie, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 228; and Varley,
supra note 72 at 488.
78 See Shanklin PierLd. v. Detel Products L, [1951] 2 KB. 854.
79 Ile use of trust is the most frequent solution to the problem in England and Australia. See
"Debt Subordination," supra note 4 at 108. See also the section entitled "Trust," above.
80 See McCannell v. Mabee McLaren Motors Limited (1926), 36 B.C.LR. 369 (C.A.); and New
Zealand Shipping Co. v.AM. Satterthwaite & Co., [1975] A.C. 154 (P.C.).
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third-party beneficiary in some circumstances to enforce the waiver.81
Another method is to treat all parties as if they were part of a multi-
party contract, as in the case of a sporting association. In Clarke v. Earl
of Dunraven,8 2 the House of Lords held that where yacht owners each
had contracts with the club to obey rules, these separate contracts were
sufficient to create a liability of one yacht owner to another to obey the
rules and to create a contractual obligation to that effect.8 3
Three writers have extended this principle:
There is a principle, however, by which where through a single co-ordinator different
parties agree to bind themselves by common rules, each of the parties may be bound to
the other parties though they enter the contract at different times and in ignorance of the
identity of the others. If, however, a bond issue is structured so that it subordinates those
entering the agreement, the issue may operate not merely as a contract between the
company issuer and bondholder, but between bondholder and subsequent borrowers
entering a relationship with the company with reference to the terms of the subordinated
bond issue.84
This method of third-party enforcement may not solve all the problems
as it does not necessarily deal with situations in which the senior
creditor's agreement with the debtor company predates the rules for the
subordinated debt.85
The most direct approach to the privity problem is statutory
abolition. In Canada, this has been done only in certain PPSA contexts.
It is unlikely that there will be any more general statutory alteration of
the privity doctrine. As a result, it is probably safest for a senior creditor
to ensure that it is a party to any subordination agreement it may wish to
enforce. Only in this way may it be certain that the privity doctrine will
not frustrate its expectations.
8 1 See the section entitled "Waiver," above.
82 [1897] A.C. 59 (H.L.) [hereinafter Clarke]. See also "Contractual Debt Subordination,"
supra note 61 at 243.
83 Clarke, ibid at 63.
84 G.A. Penn, A.M. Shea & A. Arora, Banking Law, vol. 1: The Law Relating to Domestic
Banking (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) at 155. Note, however, that this solution works only if
all relevant parties are in a contract with one single person, i.e., the debtor.
85 See "Contractual Debt Subordination," supra note 61 at 244.
1994]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
5. Security Interest
Perhaps the most important question, as regards the effects of a
subordination agreement, is whether it creates a security interest and,
thereby, constitutes a security agreement.8 6 According to Grant
Gilmore, one of the drafters of Article 9 of the ucc, "[t]he subordination
agreement completely escaped the attention of the Article 9 draftsmen.
No thought was ever given to whether a claim asserted by [a] senior
against an insolvent subordinator was or was not the assertion of a
security interest. '87 A typical definition of "security interest" is given in
section 1(1)(qq) of the Alberta PPSA: "(i) an interest in goods, chattel
paper, a security, a document of title, an instrument, money or an
intangible that secures payment or performance of an obligation."88
Does not the effect of the subordination agreement give at least
the senior creditors a security they would not otherwise have? Do they
not now have entitlement to particular money or property to ensure that
obligations owing to them are satisfied? Is their claim not something
they could insist on in the event of the subordinated creditor's
bankruptcy? If the answers to these questions are positive, then does
not a subordination agreement create a security interest, and, therefore,
should not the senior creditor who seeks to take advantage of it perfect
its interest in some way? The security interest, if there is one, is between
the two creditors-the senior and the subordinated creditor-for it is in
the property of the subordinated creditor that the senior creditor can be
said to have taken an interest. The subordinated debt is the collateral
for the debt to the senior creditor. The interest of the senior creditor is
in the debt that the debtor owes the subordinated creditor, which is the
property of the subordinated creditor.89 The argument that a
subordination agreement creates a security interest is bolstered
86 In jurisdictions without a PPSA, the equivalent would be a form of charge which is
registrable in a registry such as the Companies Registry. See Powell, supra note 18 at 372-74; and
The Law of Subordinated Debt, supra note 3 at c. 5.
8 7 Supra note 10 at 998.
88 Other PPSAs are variations on this theme with somewhat different exclusions and
inclusions. See supra note 7 at: British Columbia, s. 1(1); Manitoba, s. 1; Ontario, s. 1(1);
Saskatchewan, s. 2(nn); and Yukon, s. 1(1).
89 If the debt that is the subject of the subordination agreement is itself the subject of a
security interest in specific goods, then, if the subordination agreement constitutes a security
interest, it is a security interest in chattel paper. See, supra note 7, the definition of "chattel paper"
provided in: Alberta, s. 1(1)(e); British Columbia, s. 1(1); Manitoba, s. 1; Ontario, s. 1(1);
Saskatchewan, s. 2(e); and Yukon, s. 1(1).
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somewhat by the fact that a subordination agreement relating to security
replaces in substance what the old floating charges used to do. There is
no question that the floating charge is a security interest. A
subordination agreement as security agreement is not incompatible with
the contractual analysis, discussed earlier, since security agreements are
based on contract as well.
Gilmore was of the view that a subordination agreement was
itself a sort of "security arrangement. ' '9° He writes:
There is clearly an obligation: the senior's claim against the common debtor. Does the
subordinator's agreement that the senior shall be first paid transfer an "interest" in his
"property" (i.e., the subordinated claim) which "secures" payment of the obligation? Our
discussion proceeds on the hypothesis that the senior is in fact claiming that the common
debtor should pay him in priority to the subordinator's trustee in bankruptcy (or an
attaching creditor or a transferee). If the claim is successful, the senior surely gets an
"interest" in the subordinator's "property," nor does it seem totally implausible to say
that the interest "secures" the underlying "obligation."91
The senior creditor ought to be expected to give the same notice to other
parties and creditors if it wants to get the benefit of the subordination
agreement to their detriment. According to Gilmore, "[a] creditor who
wants to claim priority over other creditors in specific assets should no
more be able to avoid the perfection requirements of the Article by
calling his arrangement 'subordination agreement' than he could by
calling it 'consignment,' 'lease,' 'trust,' or whatnot."92
An advantage of treating a subordination agreement as a security
agreement and subject to the PPSA is that it would give the senior
creditor some security in the event of the subordinated creditor's
bankruptcy, assuming the senior creditor perfected its "security
interest." Another advantage is to give notice of such interests to third
parties. The debt of one creditor may not be perceived by third parties
to be "encumbered" by a subordination agreement. Forcing the senior
creditor to register the subordination agreement (because it creates a
security interest that should be perfected) would eliminate many of the
ostensible ownership problems. While undoubtedly in many cases the
parties do not intend their subordination agreement to be a security
agreement, in other cases the whole point of entering into the
subordination agreement is to restrict the ability of the subordinated
90 Supra note 10 at 985.
91 Ibid at 996.
92 ]bid. at 997.
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creditor and the debtor to deal freely with their debt. This is similar to
what happens with a "normal" security agreement.93
One of the problems with subordination agreements is the
secrecy that can surround them. They play an important role in
determining rights to a debtor's property and can affect priority, but yet,
unless they are security agreements, there is no requirement to register
(or otherwise perfect) them.94 One argument against a registration
requirement is that there could conceivably be so many different
creditors involved that it would not be feasible to require registrations.
The existence of a security interest and a corresponding duty to register
seems odd, especially in the context of an ab initio subordination in
which the two creditors may never have any direct dealing and may not
even know of the other's exact identity. It may also be argued that
subordination agreements relating to security only change the priority
position as between two parties but do not affect the over-all priority
structure which is based on the PPSA and Bank Act rules. There is no
new collateral, just an alteration of existing debtor-creditor relations.
On the other hand, absent a requirement of registration, there is no way
for one would-be creditor to ensure that there is not another senior
creditor who will claim rights to the same debt. Furthermore, the PPSA
requires many other registrations that are inconvenient and can involve
many creditors.95 As to collateral, it can be argued that if there is no
new collateral in a subordination agreement situation, then there is no
new collateral in any situation involving chattel paper; and that
conclusion is certainly contrary to the PPSA. Additionally, if a
subordination agreement is accompanied by an assignment, or itself
constitutes an assignment, then the PPSA applies regardless because a
security interest has been created.
There are strong reasons, however, for not treating
subordination agreements as security agreements. If subordination
agreements created security interests, then the senior creditors would be
subject to all the limits on secured parties, such as priorities, proceeds,
registration requirements, and purchasers taking free. If the
93 See "Contractual Debt Subordination," supra note 61 at 227.
94 A subordination agreement is not the only PPSA entity affected by secrecy; another is
fixtures. See B. MacDougall, "Fixtures and the PPSA: of the Wooden Horse of Troy, Creditors in
the Weeds and Statutory Ambush" (1993) 72 Can. Bar Rev. 496.
95 Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, supra note 1 at 256, suggest that a possible alternative to
requiring registration (because it is a security interest) would be to require that notice of the
subordination agreement be put on the paper evincing the subordinated debt. This would be an
alternative form of perfection.
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subordinated creditor sold its subordinated debentures, the income from
them would constitute proceeds if the subordination agreement created
a security interest. It may be surprising to some if the senior creditor
were able to have access to money derived from dealing with the
subordinated creditor's debentures, absent an explicit clause in the
subordination agreement to that effect.
Another reason for not treating a subordination agreement as
creating a security interest is that the parties to the subordination
agreement do not expect that they will have the roles of secured party
and debtor in the event that the subordination agreement must be relied
upon. However, the subjective intention of the parties plays only a
small role in determining whether a security interest has been created.
It matters little whether the parties expected their lease, for instance, to
be classified as a security agreement, so it should matter little with
respect to the subordination agreement. Another problem is how one
should perfect a security interest in subordinated debt. Ought the senior
creditor to take possession of it? If this is impractical, then against
whom, as debtor, ought the senior creditor to file a financing statement?
In some cases, the subordinated creditor may be a shifting group of
institutional investors. Perhaps the filing should be against the
subordinated creditor and the debtor. This might also affect where the
financing statement should be filed. The various subordinated creditors
and the debtor might be in different jurisdictions. Then there is the
problem of determining who would be the filing creditor when the
subordination agreement between the debtor and the subordinated
creditor contemplates a number of potential senior creditors. If the
subordinated creditor's interest is one governed by the Bank Act, then
there is a problem in determining where the security interest created by
the subordination should be perfected. The Bank Act makes no
provision for such a registration.
Some writers have sought to solve the problem of whether a
subordination agreement constitutes a security agreement or creates a
security interest by distinguishing an ab initio subordination from a
private subordination. It is arguable that, when a debtor issues debt
from the start in subordinated form, i.e., as an ab initio subordination,
the subordinated creditor "grants" no rights when it creates the
subordination. Therefore, this type of subordination-giving the
subordinated creditor a limited debt from the outset-does not create a
security interest. This is the view of Coogan, Kripke and Weiss,96 who
argue that such a transaction does not create a debtor-secured party
96 bi
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relationship. There is no contract between the senior and the
subordinated creditor, and the absence of a contract means that there is
no agreement to satisfy the definition of "security agreement." The
authors write:
Each [of the senior and subordinated creditors] has made his bargain with the common
debtor. the senior creditor has purchased a note or debenture that is payable in full out of
the common debtor's assets in liquidation prior to the time that any dividend is payable to
the junior creditor, the junior creditor's rights from their inception have been limited to
the right to collect from the liquidating assets only after such prior payment to the
seniorY7
Further,
The arrangement between junior and senior creditors is somewhat like that between
common and preferred stockholders-with one class coming ahead of the other in
liquidation as a result of their respective contracts with the issuer. A subordination of
this type does not evidence an intent to create a security interest by the junior in favor of
the senior creditor, any more than a certificate of common stock evidences an intent to
create a security interest in favor of a preferred stockholder.98
However, as Carlson points out, there is no difference between a
subordinated creditor's situation in an ab initio subordination agreement
and that of a debtor in a purchase money financing arrangement
concerning after-acquired property. As soon as the debtor in the
purchase money situation obtains collateral, its rights are subject to the
secured creditor's superior rights.99 In other words, the debtor never has
rights in the collateral that are not subject to the secured creditor's
interest. It is common in the PPSA for a debtor to have limited rights in
collateral from the outset. Therefore, in covering situations in which the
subordinated creditor obtains limited rights to the debt from the outset,
the PPSA is consistent. Furthermore, deciding whether a subordination
agreement creates a security interest according to when the
subordination agreement was created, i.e., in relation to the debtor's
obligations to the subordinated creditor, seems somewhat peripheral
given that the perfection requirement is intended to give other parties
9 7 1bid. at 238.
9 8 Ibid. at 239. See Zinman, supra note 39 at 6-8; R.D. Henson, "Subordinations and
Bankruptcy- Some Current Problems" (1966) 21 Bus. Law. 763 at 769 [hereinafter "Subordinations
and Bankruptcy"]; and R.D. Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 2d ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1979) [hereinafter Handbook on Secured
Transactions]. Henson says, at 194 of the handbook: "Surely no one could seriously contend that
the purchase of an ab initio subordinated note creates any kind of security interest. Nothing
whatsoever is transferred."
99 Carlson, supra note 25 at 1013.
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notice of the secured party's interest. It matters little for this purpose
when the secured party's interests arose, or how.
Coogan, Kripke, and Weiss accept that there is a somewhat
stronger argument to be made for treating a private subordination
agreement, i.e., one created after a junior debt is already in existence, as
a security agreement:
At that point [the subordinated creditor] has a bundle of rights. He gives up some of
them in favor of the senior creditor when he signs a subordination agreement. The
purpose of this surrender is to secure payment of the common debtor's obligation to the
senior creditor, it is argued that the effect of the transfer is clearly to create a securityinterest.100
However, as those writers point out, this does not deal with the question
of the intent of the parties, the practicality of requiring perfection, or the
question of how and where to perfect.
The issue of whether a subordination agreement creates a
security interest used to be very much a concern in the United States
(hence, the body of American literature on the subject). However, New
York State "solved" the problem by amending its ucc to have section 1-
209 state that subordination agreements did not create security interests.
In the United States, the Permanent Editorial Board recommended that
section 1-209 be added to the ucc as an optional provision to clarify the
situation with regard to the status of a subordination agreement.
Section 1-209 stipulates that
An obligation may be issued as subordinated to payment of another obligation of the
person obligated, or a creditor may subordinate his right to payment of an obligation by
agreement with either the person obligated or another creditor of the person obligated.
Such a subordination does not create a security interest as against either the common
debtor or a subordinated creditor. This section shall be construed as declaring the law as
it existed prior to the enactment of this section and not as modifying it.
The Official Comment to the ucc section 1-209 makes it clear
that the drafters did not think the section was necessary:
3. The last sentence of this section is intended to negate any implication that the section
changes the law. It is intended to be declaratory of pre-existing law. Both the history and
the text of Article 9 make it clear that it was not intended to cover subordination
agreements. The provisions of Section 9-203 for signature by the "debtor" would be
entirely unworkable if read to require signature by public holders of subordinated
investment securities. The priorities, filing provisions and remedies on default provided
by Article 9 would also be largely inappropriate in many situations. The precautionary
language of Section 9-316 preserving subordination of priority by agreement between
secured parties points to the conclusion that similar arrangements among unsecured
lenders are not covered unless otherwise within the scope of the Article.
100 Supra note 1 at 246. See also Zinman, supra note 39 at 3ff.
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Some of the Comment would be applicable to Canadian
jurisdictions if they were to propose adoption of sections similar to the
ucc section 1-209. The British Columbia PPSA has attempted to do this.
Section 40 provides:
(2) An agreement or undertaking to subordinate or postpone
(a) the right of a person to the performance of some or all of another obligation by
the same debtor, or
(b) Some or all of the rights of a secured party under a security agreement to some
or all of the rights of another secured party under another security agreement
with the same debtor does not, by virtue of the subordination or postponement
alone, create a security interest.
(3) Subsection (2) is deemed to have come into force on October 1, 1990 [Le., the date of
the introduction of the PPSAJ and is retroactive to the extent necessary to give it
effect on and after that date. 101
There is some question as to whether this addition to the PPSA
subordination section achieves the effect of the ucc section 1-209. Does
the "subordination or postponement alone" ever cause a subordination
agreement to be characterized as creating a security interest? As
Gilmore saw it,102 it was the interest of the senior creditor in the claim of
the subordinated creditor which gave rise to the security interest. This
may be a more complicated cause of a security interest than mere
subordination or postponement. Furthermore, if all subordination
agreements are assignments,103 then it is not the subordination or
postponement alone which gives rise to the security interest, but the fact
that there is also an assignment. As mentioned earlier, however, the
better view is that there is no equation between an assignment and a
subordination agreement unless the parties have gone beyond mere
subordination. The intent of British Columbia's PPSA section is to
eliminate the possibility of the characterization of a subordination
agreement simpliciter as creating a security interest. If the subordination
agreement goes beyond mere subordination and, for instance, expressly
creates a trust or an assignment or otherwise explicitly allows for the
senior creditor to have an interest in the property of the subordinated
creditor, then characterization as a security interest is again likely.
Although British Columbia's PPSA may have eliminated one
question, the problem remains that the ucc section 1-209 model (used
by British Columbia) clarifies only what a subordination agreement is
101 Saskatchewan, supra note 7, proposes a similar s. 40(2).
102 See text accompanying note 91.
103 See section on "Assignment," above.
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not. It does not clarify what it is 4 Even the Official Comment simply
states that "[t]he enforcement of subordination agreements is largely left
to supplementary principles."
The concern is that the ucc section 1-209 model allows a secret
lien to exist. While subordinated debt will often state its status explicitly
on its face and practical concerns about subordination agreements will
arise most frequently only in the case of double bankruptcy,1 05 the fact is
that there will be occasions when third parties will not know about a
subordinated debt and will assume that there is none. Many institutions
that would be senior creditors are sophisticated, with the undoubted
capability and clout to uncover the existence of a subordination
agreement along with the full financial picture of a party. However, such
a capability cannot be assumed of all third parties and would-be senior
creditors. That is the whole point of having the personal property
registries. All the PPSAs permit the filing of a financing change
statement to disclose that there has been a subordination of a security
interest!O6 However, this filing is not mandatory and appears to make
no difference to the effectiveness of the subordination agreement. The
express provision in the PPSA to enable filing is curious given that filing
a financing change statement is such a meaningless action.107
There is no easy answer to the question of whether a
subordination agreement ought to be characterized as creating a security
interest. As has been seen, there are arguments both ways. Ignoring the
practical registration difficulties, the stronger view is that, conceptually,
the subordination agreement will usually create a security interest. The
practical difficulties cannot, however, be ignored. The advantage of the
ucc section 1-209/British Columbia PPSA approach, whatever its faults,
is that it at least provides a definitive answer. Even if subordination
agreements could fall within the definition of "security agreement,"
there is no reason why they have to be governed by the PPSAs. Other
entities which would fall within the definition of "security agreement" or
104 See Heileson & Hirsch, supra note 15 at 560.
105 See, on this point, D.E. Osborne, "Note" (1971) 49 Tex. L Rev. 822.
10 6 Supra note 7 at: Alberta, s. 45(6); British Columbia, s. 45(6); Manitoba, s. 52(2); Ontario,
s. 50; Saskatchewan, s. 47; and Yukon, s. 47.
107 Users of the personal property registries cannot count on the registries to do much in any
event other than to put them on notice to investigate further. Filings tell little about the actual
collateral involved and the extent of the security interest.
1994]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
within the scope of creating a security interest are excluded from the
PPSAs.1o8
It should be noted that although a subordination agreement may
not constitute a security agreement, there is no question that a security
agreement can supersede and modify the effect of a subordination
agreement. Thus, if a senior creditor does not have a perfected security
interest covering the property in which it has an interest, there is a risk
that it could have its position defeated by a creditor who does. 1°9 In A-
W-D, Inc. v. Salkeld,110 a first supplier had already obtained a security
agreement from a distributor when the second supplier obtained a
security agreement from the same distributor. The second security
agreement stated simply that the second supplier would be put in second
place as creditor. The second supplier perfected its security interest,
whereas the first did not. It was held that the wording involved did not
create a subordination agreement, and that the second supplier was
entitled to priority by virtue of its having perfected its interest.
B. Multiple Subordinations
A problem can arise if there is more than one debt or if there is
more than one subordination of a debt. The problem arises because a
subordination agreement can be secret. Creditor A might subordinate
its interest to Creditor B and then to Creditor C. Who, as between
Creditor B and Creditor C, has priority? Absent any rule, it might seem
reasonable to turn to the common law, which provides that priority
would go to the first in time, viz. Creditor B; but what if Creditor B
knows of Creditor C's intentions, or what if Creditor C is a secured party
but Creditor B is not? The status of Creditor C as a secured party would
be relevant only if Creditor C's security interest related directly to the
"collateral" involved in the dispute between Creditor B and Creditor C,
i.e., the debt owed to Creditor A. If the subordination agreements do
not create security interests, then actual knowledge may be important in
deciding who ought to have priority. If the PPSA is involved because the
subordination agreements create security interests, then actual
108 All PPSAs have an exclusion section. See s. 4 in Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and
Saskatchewan; and s. 3 in Manitoba and Yukon.
109 Allegaertv. ChemicalBank, 657 F. 2d 495,508 (2d Cir. 1980).
110 372 N.E. 2d 486 (Ind. CA. 3d Dist. 1978).
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knowledge should be irrelevant.111 It has been argued in the United
States that subordination agreements are analogous to assignments and,
therefore, the first subordination agreement would prevail over the
second because of the law of assignments.112 Another writer has said
that a naked subordination given to one creditor does not prevent the
subordinating creditor from giving a parallel subordination to other
creditors.11 3 A court, faced with this situation, might try to avoid
choosing one of Creditor B or Creditor C and simply award each
damages for breach of contract by Creditor A. Creditors B and C would
be seeking an equitable remedy of specific performance of their
contracts with Creditor A and the court might legitimately exercise its
discretion not to award specific performance of either contract.
A different situation arises when Creditor X subordinates its
interest to Creditor Y who subordinates to Creditor Z. Should Creditor
Y simply be ignored and the situation treated as though Creditor X were
subordinate to Creditor Z? Although that would appear to be an
efficient way to deal with the situation, it is truer to the facts if the
subordinations are considered separately and apart from each other.
Creditors Y and Z were probably only aware of their immediate
subordinations when they entered the contracts as senior creditors.
Given full knowledge, the agreements would presumably deal explicitly
with the situation. Creditor Z would probably have taken an outright
assignment of Creditor Y's position. The problem could become more
complex if there were more than one subordination agreement at each
level of the subordinations. One possible solution for a creditor would
be to obtain a warranty from the subordinated creditor to the effect that
the debt is neither already subordinated nor senior to another debt. It
would be easier to avoid circularity problems if there were no more than
one level of subordinated debt. A further problem is the possibility of
circularity when Creditor L is subordinate to Creditor M, who is
111 Note that in Carson Restaurants International Ltd. v. A-1 United Restaurant Supply Ltd.,
[1989] 1 W.W.R. 266 (Sask. Q.B.) at 275, the Court used an obligation of "good faith" to upset the
priority rules of the PPSA to prevent an "unjust result" in the context of actual knowledge.
112 See "Subordination Agreements," supra note 11 at 401.
113 See Golin, supra note 16 at 371; and Lopes, supra note 15 at 221.
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subordinate to Creditor N, who is subordinate to Creditor L. Like all
circularity problems, there is no perfect solution.114
C. Subordination Agreements and Bankruptcy
One question that has troubled Australian,11 5 English, and New
Zealand11 6 courts is whether a subordination, particularly one relating to
debt, is enforceable against the trustee in bankruptcy in the event of the
debtor's bankruptcy. 117 Where a creditor does not have a special status,
such as a perfected security interest, English law applies the paripassu
principle to have the trustee in bankruptcy effect a distribution to the
creditors.11 8 A subordination agreement, in which the senior creditor is
unsecured and the subordinated creditor is secured, could be seen to be
circumventing theparipassu principle. Similarly, the principle could be
affected if the parties were all unsecured creditors. The pari passu
principle does not apply to secured creditors, and subordination
agreements between them relating to security priority should be valid as
not infringing theparipassu principle.1 19 This issue has not caused much
problem in the United States. In Bird & Sons,120 the Court held that a
subordination agreement "violated no public policy nor the spirit of the
bankruptcy law." 121 In England, however, the question of the validity of
subordination agreements in bankruptcy was dealt with by the House of
Lords in British Eagle International Airlines Ltd. v. Compagnie Nationale
114 On the multiple subordinations problems, see Lopes, supra note 15 at 221; "Debt
Subordination," supra note 4 at 137; Gilmore, supra note 10 at 1021; and The Law of Subordinated
Debt, supra note 3 at 20 (who notes that circularity problems often result from drafting errors).
Cuming and Wood deal with the situation of an intervening security interest ranking between the
security interest of the subordinated creditor and the claim of the senior creditor in British
Columbia Personal Property SecurityAct Handbook, supra note 7 at 305-06.
115 For Australian, English, and New Zealand developments, see "Debt Subordination," supra
note 4 at 94ff.; and Powell, supra note 18 passim.
116 See R.B. Grantham, "Legal Imperialism and Debt Subordination" (1989) N.Z. LJ. 224;
and see generally, J.H. Farrar, "Comment" (1988) J. Bus. L 76.
117 Obviously, the creditors can choose to sort out their dividends between themselves after
distribution, but this would involve considerable uncertainty and extra costs.
118 InsolvencyAct 1986 (U.K.), 1986, c. 45, ss. 107,328(3).
119 See Re Woodroffes (Musical Instruments) Ltd, [1985] 2 All E.R. 908; and Penn, Shea &
Arora, supra note 84 at 153.
12 0 Supra note 5.
121 Ibid. at 373. See also Re Credit Industrial Corporation, 366 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1966); and
InternationalFinance, supra note 25 at 404-05.
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Air France,122 in which Lord Cross held that the "contracting out" of the
paripassu principle was "contrary to public policy."123
A somewhat different approach was taken in Australia in Home
v. Chester & Fein Property Developments Ply. Ltd.,124 in which there had
been a contract among three holders of units in a trust to the effect that
if any party made an additional loan to the company that altered the
existing ratio of loans between the parties, the excess would have to be
repaid in priority to the other loans. Whether such a provision were
valid in light of the pari passu rule on liquidation-section 440 of the
Victorian Companies Code-was later decided by the Court. Southwell
J. distinguished British Eagle on its facts on the basis that the present
case would not affect third parties since all parties who could be affected
were parties to the contract to alter theparipassu rule. He writes: "In
my opinion, s. 440 does not require that in all cases a liquidator must
distribute pari passu. He may distribute in accordance with an
agreement between the parties where to do so could not adversely affect
any creditor not a party to the agreement." 125
Southwell J. attempted to distinguish his case from British Eagle,
but arguably the two cases represent two different lines of authority on
the public policy towards subordination agreements.1 26 The lines of
authority can only be reconciled if one accepts the need to distinguish
between a "private" contractual subordination-affecting only the
parties to the contract-and a "full" subordination agreement, which
purports to affect others. The objection is to the latter. The effect of
the distinction is that a subordination agreement would not be asserted
in a bankruptcy, a liquidation, or against a third party, but would merely
be relevant to the contracting parties' private affairs.127
122 [1975] 1 W.LR. 758 [hereinafter British Eagle].
123 Ibid. at 780. See "Contractual Debt Subordination," supra note 61 at 234. The Review
Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice recommended that creditors be able to subordinate
their debt: (U.K., Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (Sir Kenneth Cork,
GBE, Chairman) (London: H.M.S.O., 1982)). However, the Insolvency Act 1986, supra note 118,
was enacted without any provision changing theparipassu principle.
124 (1986), 11 A.C.LR. 485 (Viet. S.C.).
125 Ibid. at 494. Southwell J. relied heavily on the New Zealand case of Re Walker
Construction Company Limited (in liq.) (1960), 79 N.Z.LR. 523 (S.C.), in which the court's decision
appears to be at odds with the decision in British Eagle.
126 See Goode, supra note 41 at 95-97.
12 7 See Penn, Shea & Arora, supra note 84 at 152-53.
1994]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 32 NO. 2
The general rule in Canadian bankruptcy law is that the pari
passu principle applies unless the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act128
otherwise stipulates.12 9 There is no authoritative Canadian judicial
statement on the point. Andrew J. F. Kent has stated that:
[l]f tested, the Canadian courts will hold that the trustee can and should recognize a
voluntary payment subordination agreed to between the borrower and an unsecured
creditor. The business case for that result is compelling. There are a number of useful
general statements in the bankruptcy cases about the law of bankruptcy being a part of
the law of equity, and about the Bankruptcy Act being a business person's statute, which
could be used to support that result. Furthermore, it has been held that preferred
creditors are competent to waive their preferred status. If so, why shouldn't a general
unsecured creditor be competent to waive that status for the benefit of other general
unsecured creditors?13 0
The reason one might not expect such a waiver is that Canadian
courts have been very reluctant to disturb the principle set out in section
141 of the Bankruptcy Act.131 Section 141 states that, absent a provision
in the Act, "all claims proved in a bankruptcy shall be paid rateably."
This equality rule has been affirmed several times. 132 Even though the
courts have hinted at their ability to use equitable principles 3 3 to alter
the principle of equality, they have been reluctant to use it.134 The
benefit of subordination agreements to debtors in terms of making
available additional financing should be adequate reason, it is to be
hoped, to encourage Canadian courts, when confronted by the situation,
to follow the generous American example rather than the disapproving
English one.
128 S.C. 1992, c. 27.
129 On the constitutional relationship between the PPSAs and the bankruptcy legislation, see
AJ. Roman & MJ. Sweatman, "The Conflict Between Canadian Provincial Personal Property
Security Acts and the Federal Bankruptcy Act: The War Is Over" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 77; and
J.S. Ziegel, "Personal Property Security and Bankruptcy. There Is No Warl A Reply to Roman and
Sweatman" (1993) 72 Can. Bar Rev. 44.
13 0 Supra note 17 at 38.
13 1 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended by the Bankruptcy and InsolvencyAct, supra note 128.
132 See Re Ony (Canadian Garment Company) Exparte Orchikofsky (1924), 3 C.B.R. 44, rev'd
3 C.B.R. 737 (Ont. CA.); and Re Keele- Wdson Supermarkets Ltd. (1990), 78 C.B.R. (N.S.) 189 (Ont.
S.C.).
133 Section 183(1) of the BanluptcyAct, supra note 131.
134 See Eastern Canada Savings and Loan Company v. Campbell (No. 2) (1971), 16 C.B.R.
(N.S.) 75 (P.E.I. Ct. Ch.); and Re Canadian Tabulating Card Co. (1972), 17 C.B.R. (N.S.) 248 (Ont.
S.C.).
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Support for this approach can be had from the case of Re Carling
Acceptance Ltd*135 in which shareholders of the debtor company lent it
money on the condition that they would not require repayment until the
company's surplus reached a certain figure. Upon the proposal in the
company's bankruptcy, the shareholders attempted to prove their claims.
The Court regarded the claims of the shareholders as contingent and,
thus, governed by what was then section 95 of the Bankruptcy Act.136
The Court held that the claims were not provable because the
contingency involved-a valuation-had not taken place. The Court,
however, also found "an equitable aspect" to the situation. Hughes J.
writes:
[Having represented to the public in a prospectus for which [the shareholders involved]
are responsible that the loan was not repayable until $150,000 accumulated in the earned
surplus account, they should not, in my view, be now allowed to prove their claims in the
same category as other creditors.13 7
A subordination agreement is similar to a contingent claim in that it is
an ordering of debt payment in an other-than-ordinary way. As has been
seen, some subordination agreements contain their own contingencies.
The reasoning of Hughes J. ought to apply to any situation in which it is
argued that a subordination agreement should be ignored by the trustee
in bankruptcy.
If the subordination agreement relates only to a rearrangement
of priority among secured parties, then there does not seem to be much
to be concerned about with regard to bankruptcy. So long as all the
135 (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 258 (Ont. S.C.) [hereinafter Re Car/ing].
136 The BankluptcyAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-3, ss. 95(1) and (2) then provided:
(1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject at the date
of the bankruptcy or to which he may become subject before his discharge by reason
of any obligation incurred before the date of the bankruptcy shall be deemed to be
claims provable in proceedings under this Act.
(2) The court shall, on the application of the trustee, determine whether any contingent
claim or any unliquidated claim is a provable claim, and, if a provable claim, it shall
value such claim, and such claim shall after, but not before, such valuation be deemed
a proved claim to the amount of its valuation.
The equivalent sections are now s. 121(1) and (2) of the Bankruptcy Act, supra note 131.
Section 121(1) has been amended by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, supra note 128, s. 50 and
now reads:
(1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day
on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which the bankrupt may become
subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before
the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims
provable in proceedings under this Act.
13 7 Re Caring, supra note 135 at 263.
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secured claims are valid and perfected, the order among secured parties
does not concern the trustee in bankruptcy. However, there may be
complications if the senior creditor's claim is not a secured interest or if
it constitutes a security interest in the subordinated creditor's claim
against the debtor. In both these cases, as discussed earlier, the
subordination agreement might have to be registered as a security
interest.
A problem connected to bankruptcy is whether, assuming the
subordination agreement is enforceable in bankruptcy, a senior creditor
would get a double dividend by virtue of the subordination agreement.
The double dividend means not only that the senior creditor gets its own
dividend, but also that the subordinated creditor's dividend is available
to satisfy any remaining claims. Once the debt to the senior creditor has
been paid, the remainder of the subordinated creditor's dividend is put
toward the subordinated creditor's own claim. The alternative to the
double dividend solution is general demotion, whereby the subordinated
creditor drops to the bottom of the list of all creditors. The difficulty
with this latter solution is that, if numerous creditors were involved, the
senior creditor might not receive any particularly-valuable benefit, while
the subordinated creditor would almost certainly recover nothing.
The difference between the double dividend situation and the
general demotion theory can be explained with the following example.
Assume that there are five unsecured creditors of the bankrupt debtor:
A, B, C, D, and E. Assume that B and D have a private subordination
agreement which is enforceable in bankruptcy. In the double dividend
approach, for the purposes of deciding how many dividends are to be
paid, the trustee in bankruptcy would look upon the unsecured creditors
as follows: A, B, C, D, E; each individual creditor getting its requisite
share in the distribution, i.e., D would get its share as would B.
However, for the purpose of paying out, the trustee in bankruptcy would
combine D and B's shares, using the collective sum to satisfy D's claims
first, the remainder going to B. The arrangement would have no effect
on the other creditors. In the general demotion approach, the trustee in
bankruptcy would look upon the unsecured creditors as follows: A, C, D,
E, then B. The subordination agreement between D and B would mean
that B falls out of the distribution picture altogether unless after the
distribution to A, C, D, and E there is still money remaining. This
approach increases the dividend to A, C, D, and E, but D does not get
nearly as much as it would in the double dividend approach, and B is
unlikely to receive any dividend at all.
The double dividend approach appears patently fairer to B and
D. They intend their subordination agreement to affect only themselves.
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The general demotion approach, on the other hand, turns what was
supposed to be a private subordination agreement into a sort of ab initio
subordination agreement in favour of all creditors except B. Carlson
argues that the double dividend, rather than the general demotion,
approach is more efficient as it reduces the cost of credit to the common
debtor. Further, double dividends provide security to the senior
creditor: "Security lowers the risk of the loan and hence lowers the price
that the senior creditor will charge."138 Finally, double dividends prevent
the other creditors from receiving a windfall at the subordinated
creditor's expense.
The double dividend issue is really only an issue in private
subordinations in which not all creditors are involved. If the
subordination agreement is intended to be for the benefit of all
creditors, then the double dividend issue is really insignificant. The
effect of double dividends is the same as a general demotion.139
A somewhat different aspect of the bankruptcy question
concerns the situation in which the subordinated party goes bankrupt.
The question is whether the senior creditor is entitled to enforce the
subordination agreement as against the trustee in bankruptcy (and other
creditors) of the subordinated creditor. The problem is particularly
complicated when the debtor goes bankrupt at the same time. The
problems this situation can create might give the senior creditor
sufficient reason to try to register the subordination agreement, as
creating a security interest, against the subordinated creditor in the
PPSA registry-where the PPSAs still allow this. Thus, the issue of
whether a subordination agreement creates a security interest is vitally
important in this situation because of the important consequences it can
entail for the senior creditor. The double-bankruptcy problem is a real
one since the subordinated creditor and the debtor are often closely
related. In Wyse, 140 the leading American case on the effectiveness of a
subordination agreement in the event of a double bankruptcy, the
United States Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, held that a subordination
agreement should be perfected in order to be effective. The Wyse case is
a bit peculiar because of a guarantee complicating the subordination
agreement, and may be of little use in Canada because of the U.S. Court
138 Carlson, supra note 25 at 985.
139 See Re Joe Newcomer Finance Company, 226 F. Supp. 387 (D. Colo. 1964).
140 Supra note 68.
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of Appeals' use of the doctrine of equitable subordination.141
Therefore, the weight that the Wyse case would be given by a Canadian
court is uncertain. That fact alone, however, highlights the ambiguity of
the law relating to subordination agreements. Obviously, in some
jurisdictions and in some cases, registering a security interest by virtue of
one's status as a senior creditor under a subordination agreement is not
an option. Given the important role that subordination agreements can
play in financing, courts ought to try to ensure that they are enforced.
However, in the end, resolution of these issues awaits further judicial
clarification of subordination agreements.
VII. CONCLUSION
The subordination agreement is an extremely malleable tool that
resists definitive statements about its nature and operation. A
subordination agreement can involve or affect two, or two hundred,
parties. It can be created at any stage in a debtor/creditor relationship.
It need have no particular form and it need not involve particular types
of creditors or debtors. It can encompass any type of debt and can be as
specific or general as the parties desire. This fluidity ensures the
usefulness of the subordination agreement. It also ensures its ability to
create difficult legal problems.
The conclusion to be drawn about the legal nature of
subordination agreements can be tentative at best. There is no reason
why a subordination agreement need be equated absolutely and
exclusively with one legal concept. Two subordination agreements need
not be characterized exactly the same way. Subordination is simply a
device used to achieve a particular result: its legal nature may be chosen
to accomodate the circumstances in any given case. The subordination
agreement should probably be distinguished from an assignment unless
the parties to the subordination agreement have made it clear that they
intend an assignment as well. Similarly, a trust analysis will not usually
be helpful unless the circumstances show that the parties intended to
create a trust. Characterization as a contract would be a natural solution
except that the doctrine of privity of contract presents hurdles that
require legislative intervention to clear. Such intervention has been
141 See Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, supra note 1 at 247-53; Heileson & Hirsch, supra note 15 at
558; Leiby, supra note 39 at 63; "Subordinations and Bankruptcy," supra note 98 passim;
"Contractual Debt Subordination," supra note 61 at 241; and Handbook on Secured Transactions,
supra note 98 at 188-92.
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forthcoming only in a very limited way. Despite strong arguments to the
contrary, subordination agreements can be accomodated within the
conceptual framework of security agreements. The practical problems
this creates in terms of perfection (how? registration where? against
whom? for how long?) are serious and may justify the exclusion of this
type of security agreement from the ambit of the PPSA, despite the
conceptual fit.
Given the important role subordination agreements can play in
facilitating debtors' access to credit, it is unthinkable that their
availability would be restricted by a conclusion that they are
unenforceable in bankruptcy. It is true that the subordination
agreement can appear frightening because of the many practical and
conceptual problems it presents. What is it? Does it infringe the pari
passu rule? How should a court deal with the double dividend problem?
How are multiple subordination cases to be resolved? This paper sets
out and discusses those problems more than it attempts to resolve them.
An attempt to simplify or gloss over the problems or to make
generalized solutions in one case will lead to grief in the next.
Restricting the use of subordination agreements in order to avoid
problems would be detrimental as it would entail inflexibility and
inefficiency in the provision of credit. Courts should strive to ensure
that subordination agreements are made as widely available as possible.
As few restrictions as possible should be placed on their creation, scope,
and enforceability. There should be no rigid insistence that they all have
the same nature, but to the extent that they might be characterized as
security agreements, applying the PPSA to them could invite chaos in
terms of the practicalities of perfection, especially with regard to ab
initio subordinations. This, obviously, is a matter for the legislature to
address rather than the courts. The usefulness of subordination
agreements will ensure the frequency of their employment. The
concomitant litigation will also ensure the ongoing attention of
lawmakers and the judiciary.
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